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Abstract
Entrepreneurial, innovative entry can have devastating effects disrupting a market. How-
ever, the many players involved including all current producers, sellers and suppliers and 
the often non-technological but organizational nature of the innovation may lead to a 
gradual restoration of the market, viz., to a new equilibrium. Entrepreneurial entry can be 
regarded as a disaster while the restoration towards a new equilibrium as disaster manage-
ment. Hardly any empirical models have been developed in order to test these ideas. This 
paper conducts the first empirical dynamic simultaneous equilibrium analysis of the role 
of entry and exit of firms, the number of firms in an industry, and profit levels in indus-
try dynamics. Our model enables to discriminate between the entrants’ entrepreneurial 
function of creating disequilibrium and their conventional role of moving the industry to 
a new equilibrium. Using a rich data set of the retail industry, we find that indeed entrants 
perform an entrepreneurial function causing long periods of disequilibrium after which a 
new equilibrium is attained. Notably, shocks to the entry rate have permanent effects on 
the industry, emphasizing the entrepreneurial function of entrants rather than their passive 
reactive function as postulated in classical economics.
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1 Introduction
The field of disaster management studies how communities and governments respond to 
a catastrophic situation such as a hurricane, bushfire, flood, volcanic eruption or an earth-
quake. Two central elements of study in this field of literature are the magnitude of disas-
ters and the recovery from disasters which includes taking care of refugees (Oloruntoba 
and Banomyong 2018). The magnitude of disasters is often measured in terms of the eco-
nomic losses they cause,1 while the recovery of disasters is typically being measured in 
terms of the time it takes to return to a sustainable post-disaster level of economic activity 
(Prasad et al. 2017). However, Xie et al. (2018) argue this only provides a partial picture of 
recovery as there is an (underanalyzed) connection between the time-path of disaster recov-
ery and disaster losses in terms of economic output and employment. In particular, these 
authors make a distinction between the repair of buildings and infrastructure, essentially 
a stock of production factors, and the lost flow of economic activity between the point at 
which the disaster strikes and the point at which recovery is completed. Xie et al. (2018) 
argue that particularly this lost flow of economic activity is interconnected with the time-
path of recovery. For instance, a time-path with vast and efficient investments in repair 
and reconstruction may be associated with smaller economic losses than a time-path with 
smaller investments. Different time-paths may also lead to different post-disaster equilibria 
having lasting impact on the economy. However, at present we don’t know much yet about 
how different time-paths of recovery are related to economic losses following a disaster.
In this paper we study economic markets and build a dynamic equilibrium model at the 
level of economic markets, which we then estimate using real world data. In particular, 
when modelling a shock to the existing equilibrium (analogous to a ‘disaster’), the model 
is able to accurately describe the features of both the new equilibrium and the time-path 
leading to that new equilibrium. Thus, we use economic modelling in order to inform dis-
aster management literature how different time-paths following a shock may be related to 
different post-shock equilibria. In this analogy, a shock (disruption or ‘disaster’) to an eco-
nomic market is usually attributed to some technological innovation. For instance, in the 
copying industry, Xerox was the dominant player until the 1970s, mainly selling big copy 
machines to large firms. When Canon entered the market with smaller, cheaper machines, 
Xerox could not respond because of their high cost structure hampering adaptation to the 
new technology. Similarly, CDC (Control Data Corporation) who dominated the 14-in. 
drive market for mainframe computers were unable to respond when the 8-in. drive market 
emerged (Bower and Christensen 1995). When a new technology is introduced as in the 
above examples, the functioning of the entire market including all current producers, sell-
ers and suppliers can be affected. For all these incumbent players the advent of a disruptive 
innovation can be interpreted as a disaster because its consequences can be a threat to their 
survival. In that sense, the advent of a technological innovation is similar to a classical 
disaster such as a natural one in the form of a flood or an earthquake or the outbreak of a 
contagious disease or a situation of political or humanitarian conflict.
The advent of a technological innovation may also produce winners such as consumers 
or incumbent players that are able to adapt and new players which enter the market imme-
diately using the new technology. The same may happen after classical disasters which may 
1 Akter and Wamba (2017) provide various estimates of total economic losses caused by recent natural 
disasters.
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lead to a restoration in the form of a new and possibly better structure or environment,2 
possibly through the help of social entrepreneurs (Ibrahim and El Ebrashi 2017). Much 
may depend upon the goals and effects of disaster management, in particular the level of 
(dynamic) economic resilience (Duhamel et  al. 2016). Market disasters, just as classical 
ones, are taken to have significant and long-lasting effects. But unlike classical disasters, 
where costs and damage tend to be huge even in the presence of human action trying to 
avoid or mitigate such costs (Tatham and Houghton 2011), the consequences of market dis-
asters can be mitigated due to the many players involved and the often non-technological 
but organizational nature of the innovation. This then leads to a gradual restoration, or in 
other words, to the gradual creation of a new equilibrium. What may seem gradual in the 
short term can work out to be profound in the longer run and be classified as disruptive 
nonetheless.
The entry of entrepreneurial, innovative firms in an industry can be classified as such a 
gradual disaster where the entrants are a threat to the incumbents, which leads to exits (i.e., 
casualties) but maybe also to a different number of firms and, more importantly, to a dif-
ferent profit level (the new equilibrium). All the dynamic simultaneous interrelationships 
between entry, exit, and industry profits can be interpreted as the disaster management 
function, and together determine the time-path and new equilibrium following an exog-
enous shock (disaster) to the system.
Entry and exit of firms constantly change the number of firms in an industry. Entry and 
exit as well as other economic conditions determine the total profit levels in an industry. 
In turn, the economic conditions and profit levels also impact entry and exit of firms. This 
interactive and dynamic process may converge to an equilibrium and induce economic pro-
gress. However, it is not immediately clear how either are reached as different economics 
schools of entrepreneurial thought exist where new firms can serve to crowd as well as 
grow markets.
While Schumpeter’s (1947) driver of economic progress is about how entrepreneurs 
generate shocks which disrupt existing market equilibrium, that of Schultz (1975) is about 
how entrepreneurs adjust to these shocks. Schumpeter (1947) simply assumes that equi-
librium is quickly restored after disruption. For Schultz (1975) disequilibria are inevitable 
features of economic progress. It takes time to regain equilibrium and the adjustment pat-
terns may vary according to the opportunities and restrictions of entrepreneurial behavior, 
just like adjustment after a classical disaster may depend on human action as well, includ-
ing the extent of cooperation between government and private firms and the amount of 
investments made to recover from the disaster (Hausken and Zhuang 2016; Wang et  al. 
2016).
In the conventional framework, entry and exit of firms, rather than the entrepreneurial 
behavior of people, play the role of adjustment mechanisms which restore market equilib-
rium. Net-entry rises when incumbents’ profits are supernormal and falls when they are at 
unsustainable low levels. In this framework, the only economic function of entrepreneurs is 
to be reactive and to respond to disequilibrium profit levels. In equilibrium, when profits are 
at normal levels, entry and exit have no role and are assumed to be in a steady state where 
entry equals exit. However, reality seems to be different, as many empirical examples from 
2 This may include a better preparedness for new disasters through learning by private enterprises and gov-
ernment organizations from each other’s disaster responses (Hausken and Zhuang 2016; Wang et al. 2016). 
However, other researchers dispute if it is in fact possible to increase preparedness for future disasters 
(Goldschmidt and Kumar 2017).
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the field of industry life cycle theory show. For many industries, it has been shown that 
the number of firms follows an inverted U-shaped relation with market age, where entry 
exceeds exit in the early stages of the industry life cycle due to innovation opportunities, 
and exit exceeds entry (shake-out) in the later stages due to a decline in product variety and 
an associated shift from product R&D to process R&D (Klepper 1997). Moreover, adjust-
ment may not be immediate, for instance due to information asymmetries between entries 
and incumbent firms. The present paper is about all three phenomena which Schumpeter 
and Schultz identify as the essence of economic progress: the effect of entry and exit on 
market equilibrium, duration of disequilibrium, and patterns of adjustment.
Baumol (2002) points out that one of the most disappointing shortcomings in the neo-
classical approach is that it does not explain the enduring success of capitalism in generat-
ing economic growth. This might have to do with the invisibility of the role of the entrepre-
neur in this approach (Barreto 1989). As Schumpeter (1947) argues, neo-classical analysis 
is preoccupied with competition without innovation and by consequence is focused on the 
adjustment process around any given equilibrium. It also does not enlighten our under-
standing of the main mystery which surrounds the determinants of the long-term dynamic 
equilibrium itself (Baumol 2002). Moving the focus of attention to this question clearly 
involves the role of entrepreneurship. Specifically, the potential for an entrepreneurial func-
tion for entrants, i.e., to discover, experiment, refine, and exploit new products or new pro-
duction processes. When we allow for such an entrepreneurial function, entrants are no 
longer assumed to be imitative ‘me too’ aspiring firms that seize their moment only when 
incumbents’ profits have become excessive. Instead, entrants may bring innovation and dif-
ferentiation to the market and in the process introduce new profit opportunities. In such a 
framework they reverse the causation so that equilibrium normal profit levels are deter-
mined by entry and exit rather than the other way around. In terms of entrepreneurial roles: 
it is the combination of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur creating instability and destruction 
and the Austrian entrepreneur combining resources to recreate stability (Wennekers and 
Thurik 1999). The Schumpeterian entrepreneur creates potential and the Austrian entre-
preneur realizes it (De Jong and Marsili 2015). This realization hinges around the pro-
cess of market dynamics with the interplay of not just entry and exit but also profit as the 
indicators of competition (Kirzner 1973).3 Implementing this view in the world of eco-
nomic modeling immediately raises the question how the interplay of entry, exit and profits 
works; particularly distinguishing between short term relationships where the neo-classical 
assumption of fixed technology may be more realistic and the longer term where entrants 
may introduce new disruptive technologies to the market (Beesley and Hamilton 1984).
The present paper specifies a full equilibrium model explaining entry, exit, the number 
of firms, and industry profit while also capturing the duration of disequilibrium and pat-
terns of adjustment (analogous to the duration and time-path of recovery following a dis-
aster; Xie et al. 2018). The model accounts for both short- and long-run effects. A unique 
feature of our model is that it allows for replacement in equilibrium, i.e., we not only 
specify an equilibrium function for the number of firms, but also equilibrium functions 
for entry and exit (which levels are consistent with the change in the equilibrium number 
of firms). We make use of a rich data set on Dutch retailing which encompasses varied 
dynamic markets such as florists, baby clothes shops and bakeries. We construct a dynamic 
simultaneous equilibrium model of entry, exit, the number of firms, and profits allowing 
3 The Kirznerian notion of entrepreneurial activity originates from the existence of disequilibria character-
ized by profit opportunities.
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for both short- and long-run effects in order to capture the Schumpeterian disequilibrium 
effects as well as the Austrian equilibrium effects of entrepreneurial entry, exit and profit. 
In this fashion we also discriminate between three aspects of industry dynamics: the effect 
of entry and exit on market equilibrium, the duration of disequilibrium, and the patterns of 
adjustment. Based on these aspects we test the main features of three seminal theories on 
the economic role of entry and exit: neoclassical theory, Schumpeter, and Schultz. In par-
ticular, we investigate three research questions. First, if the economy is exposed to an exog-
enous shock in the number of entrants, do we, in time, get back at the old equilibrium (con-
sistent with neo-classical theory), or do we arrive at a new equilibrium (consistent with an 
entrepreneurial function of entrants à la Schumpeter)? Second, regardless of whether we 
return to the old or a new equilibrium following an entry shock, how long does the adjust-
ment process take? Is equilibrium restored quickly after disruption (Schumpeter), or does it 
take longer so that disequilibrium is the norm rather than the exception (Schultz)? Third, is 
the adjustment process towards equilibrium monotonic and gradual (neo-classical theory) 
or is it non-monotonic, stressing the complex nature of adjustment (Schultz)?
To our knowledge our study is the first empirical analysis of the dynamic simultaneous 
interrelationship between entry, exit, and industry profits. It contributes to disaster manage-
ment literature by examining an understudied phase of the disaster management lifecycle, 
i.e. the phase of recovery.4 Specifically, our model can be used to inform disaster manage-
ment literature how different time-paths following a shock (‘disaster’) may be related to 
different post-shock equilibria. As we use a sophisticated simulation analysis to uncover 
these time paths, our paper also contributes to the emerging trend within disaster manage-
ment literature to use simulation modelling as an analytical tool (Mishra et al. 2018).
The next section of the paper provides a description of the data. This is followed by the 
specification of the model in Sect.  3. The estimation results are discussed in Sect.  4. In 
Sect. 5 we carry out simulations of entry and exit shocks based on the estimated param-
eters of our model. These simulations enable us to answer the three research questions for-
mulated above. Section 6 concludes.
2  Data
At an empirical level we investigate the interrelation between entry and exit levels, the 
number of firms, and profit levels. These four variables will be the key variables in the 
error-correction model which we will develop in the next section. The model parameters 
are estimated using data for a panel of shop types in a comprehensive series of markets 
within the Dutch retail sector.5 The current section describes the measurement and data 
sources for the key variables in our analysis as well as for some other covariates. This sec-
tion also provides descriptive statistics and a series of tests on stationarity and cointegration 
4 There are four stages in the disaster management life cycle: mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery (Waugh and Hy 1990; Galindo and Batta 2013). A literature review by Altay and Green (2006) 
revealed that only 11% of studies in disaster operations management literature dealt with the stage of disas-
ter recovery.
5 The industries in our data base are defined at (approximately) fourth digit level. Hence, these industries 
are quite narrowly defined. Because firms in the retail sector are almost always shops, we use the terms 
shop type and industry interchangeably throughout this paper.
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for the key variables. The results of these tests are used to develop our error-correction 
model in the next section.
2.1  Our data set
We use a data base for 41 shop types in the retail sector over the period 1980–2000. 
Our data base combines variables from two major sources: the Dutch Central Registra-
tion Office (CRK) and a panel of independent Dutch retailers (establishments) called 
‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’ (BSS) (interfirm comparison system) which was operated by 
EIM Business and Policy Research in Zoetermeer. The data are complemented by infor-
mation from several other sources. As the number of shop types investigated in BSS has 
varied in the 1980s and 1990s, our data base is an unbalanced panel. By and large, we 
have 28 shop types with data for the 1980s and 1990s and 13 shop types with data for the 
1990s only.6 The exact data period per shop type is given in Table 1. This table also con-
tains averages for some key variables in our model. Details on the measurement and source 
for each variable are given below. We apply several corrections to the raw data in order to 
make the data ready for analysis.
Raw data on the number of firms (N) and the numbers of entries (E) and exits (X) in a 
shop type are obtained from the Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK). CRK provides 
data on the number of new registrations and deregistrations of establishments for each shop 
type. Over time the sectoral classification of shop types used by CRK changed several 
times and we correct for trend breaks because of these changes.
Total industry profits (휋) are computed by multiplying average profits per firm by the 
total number of firms in a shop type. Raw data on average (net) profit per firm are taken 
from BSS. This panel was started by EIM in the 1970s and each year a large number of 
firms were asked for their financial performance. Although the panel changes from year 
to year (each year some firms exit the panel while some others enter), it is important to 
note that we compute the relative change in average profit based on only those firms pre-
sent in the panel in two consecutive years. Hence, the dynamics of these variables are not 
influenced by changes in the composition of the panel.7 Until the beginning of the 1990s 
average profit levels are computed based on about seventy individual retail stores per shop 
type but from the beginning of the 1990s the coverage of the panel decreases, i.e., less 
firms participate so that shop type averages become less reliable. Fortunately, the timing of 
this decrease coincides with the start of average financial performance registration by Sta-
tistics Netherlands (CBS) at low sectoral aggregation levels. Hence, from the early 1990s 
onwards, we have information on the development over time of these variables from two 
sources: BSS and CBS. Differences between these two sources are small which supports 
7 Hence we choose a base year to compute the level of average profits or turnover, and next we compute the 
levels for the other years making use of the relative changes of only those firms present in two consecutive 
years. As most firms stayed in the panel for many years, these relative changes are also based on a substan-
tial number of firms, but this way we correct for trend breaks introduced by a changing composition of the 
panel (e.g. when a firm with exceptionally high profits would enter or exit the panel). For the base year we 
always choose a year for which the number of participating firms in the panel is high.
6 A small part of an early version of this data set (22 shop types for the 1981–1988 period) is used explain-
ing entry and exit flows: in Carree and Thurik (1996) for their analysis of the role of incentives, barriers, 
replacement and displacement and in Carree and Thurik (1999) for their analysis of the role of carrying 
capacity.
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the reliability of our constructed times series. From 1994 onwards we use the average of 
the annual relative change implied by these two sources.8
Data on total consumer spending (CS) on the products and services sold in a certain 
shop type is taken from Statistics Netherlands (publication ‘Budgetonderzoeken’ or Budget 
statistics).9 Modal income and unemployment are also obtained from Statistics Nether-
lands, while the (nominal) interest rates are taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream, a 
provider of financial data.10 Finally, for total industry profits, modal income, consumer 
spending, and the nominal interest rate, we use a consumer price index to correct for 
inflation.
In Table 1 we give an overview of the available data. Table 1 shows that some shop 
types have grown in terms of the number of shops over the sample period, while other shop 
types have shrunk. For instance, the average number of entrants for the shop type “gro-
cers/supermarkets” is 743 while over the same period of time the average number of exits 
equals 932. This implies that the category shrunk with, on average, 189 shops each year. 
Over the entire sample period of 21 years this category shrunk with about 189 × 21 = 3969 
stores. Note that at the same time this category witnessed an inflation-corrected yearly 
profit decrease of about 0.7% and an increase in consumer spending of about 0.3%. In all 
shop types there are many stores entering the market and many shops leaving the market 
(relative to the number of firms). In some shop types entry dominates exit, while in others 
exit dominates entry. Remarkably, even in shop types where there is no net change in the 
number of stores, there are still entrants and exits. For example, the category “fish shops” 
has on average 114 stores entering and 114 stores exiting the market each year, correspond-
ing to 11% of the population of firms. Table 1 clearly shows that entry and exit levels are 
significantly positive over a long period of time. This suggests that the neo-classical idea of 
a steady-state level with entry and exit rates equal to zero is not a sufficient account of the 
patterns in the data. It seems that there exists a long-term persistent level of entry and exit 
in each shop type. As explained earlier, the current paper develops a model where these 
long-term entry and exit levels are explicitly specified.
2.2  Testing for stationarity and cointegration
Before we specify our model we test the key series for stationarity. The key variables in the 
analysis below are the log of the number of firms in a shoptype, the log of total profit in a 
shoptype, and log entry and log exit relative to the number of firms. The main reason to use 
entry and exit rates is that this allows for an easier comparison across shoptypes. We define 
the entry rate (e) and exit rate (x) as
(1.1)et = 1 +
E
t
N
t
and
8 Ideally, one would like to use information from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) as this is the national sta-
tistical office in the Netherlands. However, as the number of firms in a shop type (which is approximately 
fourth digit level) is often small, and the number of firms is rounded to thousands in CBS statistics, using 
the CBS data also implies some extent of measurement error. Therefore we use information from both 
sources to estimate the dynamic pattern of the profit and turnover variables.
9 Total consumer spending was computed by multiplying the variables average household spending, the 
total number of households in the Netherlands and the share of a certain shop type in total household 
spending.
10 See www.datas tream .com. In particular we used the series HOLIB1Y.
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where Et and Xt denote the numbers of entries and exits in year t, respectively, and Nt 
denotes the number of firms at the beginning of year t. Note that the exit rate is defined 
relative to the previous number of firms plus net-entry (as N
t+1 = Nt + Et − Xt ). In other 
words, new entrants are allowed to exit in the same year. For both rates it holds that higher 
values indicate more entries or more exits. This formulation also yields a convenient rela-
tion between et, xt, Nt and the number of firms in the next year (Nt+1), that is,11 
To test for stationarity of the log profit and log entry and log exit rates we use panel 
unit root tests. There exist basically two sets of panel unit root tests. The first set assumes 
a common AR structure across panel members under the null and a common AR structure 
under the alternative. Popular examples are the Levin et al. (2002) test and the Breitung 
(2000) t-statistic. The second set of tests assumes individual AR structures. Popular exam-
ples in this class are the Im et al. (2003) W-statistic, and the Fisher-type tests (Maddala and 
Wu 1999; Choi 2001). The alternative hypothesis in this second class of tests is that some 
of the panel members are stationary. We use the tests as they are implemented in EViews 
7.1, with all the “automatic” options for lag and bandwidth selection. If the majority of the 
shop types show a trend for a particular series we use the tests with the option of individual 
deterministic trends. Our final conclusion is based on the combined results of the tests.12
We summarize the test results in Table 2. The log entry and log exit rates do not appear 
to have a trend and the test results clearly indicate that the log entry rate and log exit rate 
(1.2)xt = 1 +
X
t
N
t+1
.
(2)
N
t+1 = Nt
e
t
x
t
, or
logN
t+1 = logNt + log et − log xt.
Table 2  p values of panel unit root tests
H0: unit root (common or individual)
Trend in test? Common unit root process Individual unit root processes
Levin, Lin 
and Chu t*
Breitung t-stat Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat
ADF—Fisher 
Chi square
PP—Fisher 
Chi square
log e No 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 0.000
log x No 0.000 – 0.000 0.000 0.000
log N Yes 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.938 1.000
log π No 0.027 – 0.219 0.127 0.351
Yes 0.000 0.334 0.001 0.000 0.003
log CS No 0.000 – 0.010 0.001 0.004
Yes 0.000 0.659 0.000 0.000 0.000
11 This can be seen as follows. It holds that e
t
= 1 +
E
t
N
t
=
N
t
+E
t
N
t
 . Also, 
x
t
= 1 +
X
t
N
t+1
=
N
t+1+Xt
N
t+1
=
N
t
+E
t
−X
t
+X
t
N
t+1
=
N
t
+E
t
N
t+1
 . Hence it follows that et
x
t
=
N
t+1
N
t
.
12 As is well known in the econometric literature, in practice it may happen that the tests contradict each 
other. Furthermore, given sample size we should not expect a very large power of the tests.
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do not contain a unit root. Note that this fits with expectations based on economic theory. 
For the number of firms we do have to correct for possible deterministic trends. The tests 
clearly show that the log of the number of firms is not stationary. Note that entry and exit 
together measure the change in number of firms. For the log total profit and the log con-
sumer spending in a shop type the presence of a trend is less easy to judge. Therefore, we 
present the results for the tests without correcting for trends as well as those where the 
trend correction is made. Table 2 clearly shows that the log consumer spending does not 
contain a unit root. For the log of total industry profit the results are less clear. We decide 
to classify this series as non-stationary.
We next test for cointegration between the log number of firms and log profits. In our 
panel set-up we test for cointegration by testing the hypothesis of a unit root in the residu-
als of a panel regression of log profit on log number of firms. Note that this hypothesis cor-
responds to no cointegration. More specifically we apply the procedure of Pedroni (1999, 
2004). This procedure is similar to the Engle and Granger (1987) method for a single time 
series. Again we use this method as implemented in EViews with all the automatic options. 
After correcting for trends the Panel PP-Statistic as well as the Panel ADF-Statistic give a 
p value of 0. Hence, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. We conclude that 
total industry profits and the number of firms are indeed cointegrated. The conclusion of 
cointegration matches with the economic reasoning that, in the long run, the number of 
firms is tied to the profit level.
3  The model
In this section we develop our model in which we discriminate between the short term 
disequilibrating and long term equilibrating roles of entry and exit. We explicitly make 
room for an analysis of the net change, the duration, and the pattern of the move from an 
initial to the next equilibrium. The model is constructed in order to account for the insights 
on dynamic equilibrium from both the economics and organizational ecology literatures. 
At the core of industrial economics and organizational ecology theories is the common 
concept that every market has a long run limit on the number of firms that it can sustain 
at any point in time (Geroski 2001). In the economics literature this limit is depicted as an 
equilibrium which can be dynamic or static depending on the model in question (Audretsch 
et  al. 2001). In organizational ecology it is dynamic (with an emphasis on evolutionary 
processes) and referred to as carrying capacity of an industry (Hannan and Freeman 1989).
In this paper we seek to ascertain the importance of this dynamic point of gravitation in 
the market. We want to ascertain the strength with which a market forces the actual num-
ber of firms to converge to its carrying capacity or equilibrium. If this force is sufficiently 
weak, so that disequilibrium or deviation from the carrying capacity is the norm rather 
than the exception, then both the scale of deviation between the actual number of firms and 
the steady state equivalent as well as the rate and path of the adjustment process become 
key dimensions of business performance. From a public policy perspective, it is important 
to know the strength of such market gravity. If market gravity is weak and if there are 
market failures associated with the supply of new ventures then it raises the question of 
whether enterprise policy should run counter to crowding so that it is more active when 
the market is below its carrying capacity and less/in active when it is above. But to have 
the full answer to that we need to know the extent to which firm entry serves a passive eco-
nomic function of restoring a dynamic equilibrium or whether it delivers an entrepreneurial 
 Annals of Operations Research
1 3
function of altering the carrying capacity of a market. Put differently, do entrants crowd or 
create market space? The following model is constructed in order to provide some answers 
which will help inform this debate.
Denote by πit the total profit in shop type i = 1, …, N during year t = 1, …,Ti. Next, 
eit and xit give the entry and exit rate for shop type i in year t, respectively, as defined in 
Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2). Finally, Nit gives the number of firms in market i at the beginning of 
year t. As shown in Eq.  (2), the log number of firms at the beginning of year t + 1 is by 
definition equal to log Nit+1 = log Nit + log eit − log xit. In this section we develop a model 
describing the log of total industry (shop type) profits as well as the log of the number of 
entrants and the log of the number of exits. The model therefore also implicitly describes 
the number of firms.
We specify a model in which the changes in entry, exit and profit are related to short-
term dynamics, changes in exogenous variables and to deviations from the steady-state of 
the market. The exogenous variables related to market i in year t are denoted by Zit. We 
specify a vector error-correction model [VECM] (see Hendry et al. 1984). Although our 
VECM specifies the short-term change in entry, exit and profit, the error-correction frame-
work also gives insight into the long-run relationships (Granger 1993). We specify the 
VECM for the three endogenous variables such that it is consistent with the earlier findings 
that log entry and log exit are stationary and that log profits and log number of firms are 
cointegrated. We first specify the long-run steady state equations
where log eit*, log xit*, log Nit*, and log π*it denote the steady state levels for log entry rate, 
log exit rate, log number of firms, and log industry profit, respectively. The steady state 
levels depend on exogenous variables describing the market situations. These variables are 
denoted by We
it
 , Wx
it
 , and WN
it
 . In other words, in the long-run steady state entry and exit 
rates are constant, and the carrying capacity of a shop type is a function of the total profit 
in that shop type. The relationship between carrying capacity and total profits possibly con-
tains a trend. This allows the long-term profits to change without a compensating change 
in the carrying capacity. Conversely, the number of firms could change in the equilibrium 
without an effect on the profits. The latter case would correspond to a difference in the 
equilibrium levels of entry and exit.
An interesting hypothesis to test is κi = 0, which implies no trend in the equilibrium rela-
tionship between number of firms and profits. Another interesting hypothesis is whether 
“on average” Δlog N*it = log eit* − log xit* = 0. This would imply that in the steady state the 
market does not grow or shrink. To formalize this hypothesis, we will mean center the vari-
ables in Wit such that the hypothesis can be stated as γ1i = γ2i.
In case entry and exit do not cancel each other log N has a trend in equilibrium. From 
(3.3) we can obtain whether profits will also show a trend in equilibrium. The slope of the 
equilibrium trend in profits is given by 훾1i−훾2i−휅i
휆
 : with this trend the drift on the left hand 
side of (3.3) equals the drift on the right-hand side of (3.3) as
(3.1)log e∗it = 훾1i +We�it 훿1
(3.2)log x∗it = 훾2i +Wx�it 훿2
(3.3)logN∗it = 훾3i +WN�it 훿3 + 휅it + 휆 log휋∗it
(4)훾1i − 훾2i = 휅i + 휆
훾1i − 훾2i − 휅i
휆
.
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Note that, if λ ≠ 0, we can also define the equilibrium relationship (3.3) between the 
number of firms and profits the other way around, that is,
In Eq. (5.1), the total profit instead of the carrying capacity is seen as the focal variable, 
while in (5.2) the left hand side indicates log average profit if λ = 1.
The short term changes in entry rate, exit rate and total industry profit are related to lagged 
changes, exogenous changes in the economy and the deviation from the steady state in the last 
period. We capture all these effects in a VECM. In this model we ensure that Eqs. (3.1)–(3.3) 
indeed represents the steady state. Our VECM becomes
where Zit denotes a vector of exogenous variables related to the economic conditions. The 
first term on the right-hand side of (1) makes sure that in equilibrium profits indeed grow 
with rate equal to (훾1i − 훾2i − 휅i)∕휆 . Note that the inclusion of this term has no impact on 
the fit of the model as all three equilibrium relations in (3) contain a market-specific inter-
cept. This term is only included to facilitate an easy interpretation of the parameters. Next 
Γ is a matrix and contains the speed of adjustment of entry, exit and profits to a potential 
disequilibrium in all three equilibrium relations. Note that a disequilibrium in one dimen-
sion can be corrected through a change in another dimension. For example, if profit levels 
are above equilibrium the market can (partly) correct this through additional entry.
The error terms are expected to be correlated within a market. In particular, we expect a 
positive correlation between entry and exit. We assume that there is no correlation over time 
or across markets. That is, we specify
To economize on the number of parameters we restrict the covariance structure such that 
the correlations are the same across markets. We parameterize the variance such that
(5.1)log휋∗
it
=
1
휆
logN∗
it
−
훾3i
휆
−
1
휆
W
N�
it
훿3 −
휅
i
휆
t or
(5.2)log휋∗
it
−
1
휆
logN∗
it
= −
훾3i
휆
−
1
휆
W
N�
it
훿3 −
휅
i
휆
t.
(6)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
Δ log e
it
Δ log x
it
Δ log휋
it
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
= (I − A)
⎛⎜⎜⎝
0
0
(훾
i1 − 훾i2 − 휅i)∕휆
⎞⎟⎟⎠ + A
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
Δ log e
it−1
Δ log x
it−1
Δ log휋
it−1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ BΔZ
it
+ Γ
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
log e
it−1 − log e
∗
it−1
log x
it−1 − log x
∗
it−1�
log휋
it−1 −
1
휆
logN
it−1
�
−
�
log휋∗
it−1
−
1
휆
logN∗
it−1
�
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
휀
it
휂
it
휉
it
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
(7)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
휀
it
휂
it
휉
it
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
∼ N(0,Ω
i
).
(8)Ωi =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
휎휀,i 0 0
0 휎휂,i 0
0 0 휎휉,i
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎝
1 휌휀휂 휌휀휉
휌휀휂 1 휌휂휉
휌휀휉 휌휂휉 1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎝
휎휀,i 0 0
0 휎휂,i 0
0 0 휎휉,i
⎞⎟⎟⎠.
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The ρ-parameters now denote the correlations between different error terms, while for 
example 휎2
휀,i
 gives the variance of the error term associated with log entry for shop type i.
3.1  Further insight in the steady‑state relations
The VECM allows for various equilibrium relations. The model can capture a market 
where in equilibrium nothing changes, but also markets where, for example, in equilibrium 
entry exceeds exit and average profits per firm decline.
In Fig. 1 we illustrate four steady state combinations for profits and the number of firms. 
For convenience we ignore exogenous variables and we set λ = 1. Under these conditions 
the steady-state relation between the number of firms and total industry profits can be rep-
resented by a straight line. In the top left and top right plots of Fig. 1, there is no trend in 
the carrying capacity of the market (휅 = 0) , so that the steady-state relationship between 
profits and number of firms remains constant. In this setting, we compare the case where, 
in equilibrium, entry and exit cancel each other (top left plot) to the case where in equi-
librium exit dominates (top right plot). In the bottom left and bottom right plots of Fig. 1, 
there is a trend in the carrying capacity of the market (휅 ≠ 0) , so that the steady-state rela-
tionship between profits and number of firms moves over time. In this setting we consider 
the case where the number of firms remains constant (bottom left plot) versus the case 
where exit dominates entry (bottom right plot).13
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Fig. 1  Four examples of market changes in the steady state
13 In the four examples in Fig. 1, we make use of the fact that the drift in the number of firms in industry i 
equals (훾
1i
− 훾
2i
) , while the drift in total industry profits equals (훾
1i
− 훾
2i
− 휅
i
)∕휆 . See Eq. (4).
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In the top left plot entry equals exit and there is no time trend, therefore the number 
of firms and the profit level are constant in equilibrium. This very much depicts a fairly 
static industry with an ongoing rejuvenation process where entrants replace exits. The 
retail high street for public houses (pubs serving alcohol) in some sleepy semi-rural 
towns might be the nearest empirical equivalent of this possible scenario. In essence the 
number of pubs and the profitability of this retail market remain constant over time—
replacement and displacement rates of entrants and exits equate holding the number of 
pubs in the market fixed. In ecological terms this fixed carrying capacity could resemble 
a flower bed of limited size that can accommodate a fixed number of plants—main-
tained by dying (exits) plants being replaced/displaced by an equal number of new ones 
(entrants).
In the top right plot, there is no trend in the relation between profits and carrying 
capacity, but exit dominates entry. Over time we move along the line to a lower number 
of firms and consequently lower profits. This situation depicts declining retail sector 
industry much like the decline of candle shops following the diffusion of electric light 
to homes. More recently, it is capable of depicting a situation like the decline of music 
high street record stores caused by the emergence of online music retailers.
In the bottom left plot, entry and exit cancel each other but there is a negative trend 
in the carrying capacity, or conversely a positive trend in profits when we keep the num-
ber of firms constant. The increased market opportunities (reflected by higher industry 
profits) are captured by the incumbent firms. Most likely, these firms grow.
In the final example (bottom right), there is net exit and a decrease in the carrying 
capacity given constant profits. We move along the equilibrium line while the line itself 
also moves. In this example the composite outcome is such that the profits increase. 
This situation is very much synonymous with a situation where the retail sector is expe-
riencing a rise in minimum efficient scale (MES). Increased economies of scale cause 
net exit and result in a smaller number of more monopolistic and profitable retailers. 
Although outside of our sample period, the advent of the internet and the creation of 
online retail sectors would be examples of cases where minimum efficient scale rises 
causing a smaller number of online monopolistic firms and greater sector profits.
These four examples highlight the agnostic and flexible nature of the model. In fact, 
all different situations can be distinguished based on the individual intercepts in γ1 and 
γ2 (3.1) and (3.2) and the trend coefficient κ in (3.3). In Table 3 we enumerate all 9 com-
binations of declining, stable or increasing number of firms and profits in equilibrium. 
In each cell of the table we indicate the corresponding parameter restrictions.
Table 3  Steady state behavior for profits and number of firms
Declining profits given no. 
firms
Stable profits given no. 
firms
Increasing 
profits given no. 
firms
Declining no. firms γ1 < γ2
κ > γ1 - γ2
γ1 < γ2
κ = γ1 − γ2
γ1 < γ2
κ < γ1 − γ2
Stable no. firms γ1 = γ2
κ > 0
γ1 = γ2
κ = 0
γ1 = γ2
κ < 0
Increasing no. firms γ1 > γ2
κ > γ1 − γ2
γ1 > γ2
κ = γ1 − γ2
γ1 > γ2
κ < γ1 − γ2
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3.2  Operationalization of variables
We estimate our model for the earlier mentioned collection of shop types (industries) in the 
retail sector in the Netherlands, for the period 1980–2000. Below we summarize the key 
variables and list the control variables we use:
3.2.1  Key variables
eit  Entry rate in shop type i during year t.
xit  Exit rate in shop type i during year t.
Nit  Number of firms in shop type i at start of year t.
πit  Total industry profit in shop type i in year t (in 1990 prices).
3.2.2  Variables included in vector W
log modal income: log average modal income (in 1990 prices).
log consumer spending: log total consumer spending in shop type (in 1990 prices).
log unemployment: log number of unemployed (in millions).
3.2.3  Variables included in vector Z
Vector Z contains the same variables as vector W. In addition, the real interest rate is 
included.
3.3  Explanation of expected relations between model variables
Equation (6) of our model describes the interrelations between entry, exit, and total indus-
try profits. Many empirical studies of industrial organization model the interrelation 
between entry and exit (e.g. Carree and Thurik 1996; Burke and van Stel 2014; Samaniego 
2010). When more firms leave the market, there is room for more entry (replacement). 
When more firms enter the market, some other firms may be forced to leave the market 
because it is no longer competitive enough (displacement). Also, when profits in an indus-
try increase, this attracts more firms (positive effect on entry) and incentives for firms to 
leave the market are low (negative effect on exit). Furthermore, when entry, exit or profits 
are above or below equilibrium carrying capacity, error-correction will cause these vari-
ables to move towards the steady-state level again. All these type of interactions between 
entry, exit and profits are captured by the coefficients contained in matrices A (short-term 
effects) and Γ (adjustment effects) in (6).
The vector Z in (6) contains exogenous explanatory variables for (changes in) entry, 
exit, and profit levels. In our application this vector includes the variables modal income, 
consumer spending, unemployment, and real interest rate. Modal income acts as an oppor-
tunity cost for running a retail shop, and hence this variable is expected to have a negative 
impact on entry and a positive impact on exit. Furthermore, an increase in modal income 
level may signal an overall upturn of the economy from which shopkeepers benefit as well 
(Carree and Thurik 1994). Hence the expected impact on profits is positive. The growth 
rate of consumer expenditure on the goods and services sold in a shop type is an indicator 
for demand growth. This variable is expected to have a positive impact on entry, a negative 
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impact on exit (Bergin and Bernhardt 2008), and a positive impact on profits. Changes in 
unemployment may have a positive effect on entry as the (newly) unemployed may have 
limited alternative employment options in the wage sector (Thurik et  al. 2008). Increas-
ing unemployment rates are also a disincentive to exit as economic circumstances are not 
favorable to find a different occupation. Increasing unemployment will also put pressure on 
profit levels (expected effect on profits negative). High interest rates, finally, make running 
a business more expensive, hence the expected impact on entry is negative. Also, profit 
levels may be lower when interest rates are high.
With the exception of the real interest rate, the variables from vector Z are also included 
in the vector W capturing the long-term influences on entry, exit, and profits. In other 
words, the variables in W can move the equilibrium relations. By and large, the arguments 
are the same as for the short-term impacts described above. The interest rate is not included 
in the long-run relationships for two reasons. First, the interest rate appears to be non-sta-
tionary. Therefore this variable cannot be a determinant of the steady state levels of the 
stationary variables entry and exit. Second, the interest rate is expected to only affect the 
markets in the short run. That is, the interest rate mainly influences the moment to start 
a business (hence an impact in the short run) but not the decision as such to start a busi-
ness. To the contrary modal income (indicator of opportunity costs), consumer spending 
(indicator of shop type-specific demand) and unemployment (indicator of general business 
conditions) may be seen as more structural, long-run, impacts on entry and exit. Note that 
the effects of unemployment in the long-run equations may be different from those in the 
short-term. In particular, the positive effect of unemployment on entry may be a short-term 
effect only, primarily relating to individuals who have just recently become unemployed, 
and want to start a business. In the long-term though, a structurally high level of unem-
ployment indicates bad conditions for running businesses, implying a negative relation 
with entry.
As mentioned earlier, the steady-state relation for the number of firms also contains 
total industry profits. A market with higher total profits can facilitate more firms hence the 
expected relationship is positive. What is interesting is whether the parameter for profits in 
the long-run relation (Eq. 3.3 in the model) is bigger or smaller than one. This can clearly 
be seen by writing the long-run relation for total profit in yet another way,
The left hand side of this equilibrium relation now gives the average profit per firm. A 
λ-coefficient smaller than one suggests a positive relation between the equilibrium profit 
per firm and the number of firms. This implies that more firms are associated with larger 
profits per firm. In other words, total industry profits increase disproportionally with an 
increase in the number of firms. On the contrary, a coefficient in excess of one corresponds 
to decreasing average profits per firm.14
(9)log
(
휋∗
it
N
∗
it
)
=
(
1
휆
− 1
)
logN∗
it
−
훾3i
휆
−
1
휆
W
N�
it
훿3 −
휅
i
휆
t.
14 In terms of strategic management literature, the former situation (λ < 1) is consistent with blue ocean 
strategy (Kim and Mauborgne 2005), whereas the latter situation (λ > 1) is consistent with competitive strat-
egy (Porter 1980).
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Table 4  Long-run equilibrium relations for model given in (3.1)–(3.3), standard errors in parentheses
Entry rate (log e*it) Exit rate (log x*it) No. firms versus profit (
logN∗
it
− 휆 log휋∗
it
)
Log modal income − 0.229*** − 0.080 − 1.008**
(0.081) (0.080) (0.475)
Log consumer spending 0.018 0.005 − 0.186*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.111)
Log unemployment − 0.035*** − 0.026** 0.106*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.062)
λ – – 1.072***
(0.257)
Table 5  Parameter estimates for model given in (6)–(8), standard errors in parentheses
*, **, ***parameter is significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5%, or 1%, respectively
Δlog eit Δlog xit Δlog πit
Adjustment parameters
 Excess  entryt−1 − 0.429*** 0.196*** 0.921***
(0.044) (0.032) (0.272)
 Excess  exitt−1 0.079* − 0.473*** − 0.838**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.380)
 Excess  profitt−1 0.018*** − 0.008 − 0.574***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.037)
Short-run effects
 Δlog eit−1 − 0.020 0.013 0.402*
(0.042) (0.032) (0.221)
 Δlog xit−1 − 0.056 − 0.190*** − 0.121
(0.038) (0.039) (0.250)
 Δlog πit−1 − 0.007 − 0.009* 0.080**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.036)
 Δlog modal  incomet − 0.122*** 0.044 1.620***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.207)
 Δlog consumer  spendingt 0.007 0.008 0.153***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.051)
 Δlog  unemploymentt 0.014*** − 0.012*** − 0.191***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.035)
 Δreal interest  ratet/100 − 0.028*** − 0.002 0.071
(0.009) (0.008) (0.057)
Estimated correlation structure ⎛⎜⎜⎝
1 0.350 − 0.071
0.350 1 − 0.007
− 0.071 − 0.007 1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
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4  Results
We use the model as described in Eqs.  (3)–(8) to analyze 41 different shop types in the 
Dutch retail sector. Parameter estimation is done by numerically maximizing the log likeli-
hood function using Ox 7 (Doornik 2007). The likelihood function can straightforwardly 
be obtained from the model specification.
We present the estimation results in Tables  4 and 5. First we comment on the long-
run relationships as represented in Table  4. The λ-parameter in the equilibrium relation 
between number of firms and total industry profits is significantly different from 0, but not 
significantly different from 1. This implies that the equilibrium relation between profits 
and number of firms actually dictates an equilibrium level for the average profits. In other 
words, average profits per firm are independent of the number of firms, see Eq. (9).
Modal income is negatively related to the long-run level of entry. This implies that if 
the modal income is high there are fewer firms entering the market in equilibrium. This 
perfectly corresponds to our conjecture that modal income acts as opportunity costs of 
entrepreneurship. In contrast, the equilibrium level of exit seems to be unaffected by modal 
income. This may reflect the existence of a labor market penalty where former business 
owners re-entering wage-employment experience a lower return (in terms of earnings) to 
their business ownership experience compared with the return to the experience as wage-
employee (Baptista et al. 2012). This, in turn, may lead the marginal entrepreneur to remain 
in business, even when wages increase.
Modal income and consumer spending have a negative impact on the carrying capacity 
of a market (given a certain level of total industry profits). Both variables indicate good 
economic conditions. Keeping total profits constant, in good economic conditions the mar-
ket can hold fewer firms. Stated otherwise, profitability (average profits per firm) increases 
in such conditions. The consumer spending is not significantly related to the long run entry 
and exit levels. High unemployment signals bad business conditions. Hence few firms enter 
the market and few firms exit. Turbulence in this case will be low.15 High unemployment 
also seems to lower the average profit per firm in equilibrium.16
The estimates presented in Table 5 give insight in the short-term changes. The adjust-
ment parameters indicate the way an out-of-equilibrium situation is corrected. If the entry 
level is too high relative to the equilibrium level, this leads to a short-term decrease in 
entrants in the next period and a short-term increase in the number of exits. At the same 
time, the total profit level increases. If the exit level is too high, this mainly gets corrected 
by a lower exit level in the next period. Excess exit is also associated with a decrease in 
profit levels. The entry rate is affected only slightly (though significantly at 10%). Finally, 
excessive profits are corrected through a change in profits itself and, to a small extent, by a 
(temporarily) higher number of entrants, who are attracted by the high profit level.
The short-run effects of the (lagged) endogenous variables can be best shown using 
impulse response functions. Such functions give insight on how external shocks affect all 
variables. We will present such functions in the next subsection. The short-run effects of 
the exogenous variables are easier to evaluate as they correspond to the direct impact of 
a particular change. The direct impact of an increase in modal income is that entry levels 
drop and profit levels increase, consistent with theoretical expectations. The magnitude of 
15 Turbulence is the sum of entry and exit.
16 Note that the third dependent variable in Table 4 is an inverse measure of average profits.
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these effects is relatively large. An increase in consumer spending only leads to a direct 
increase in profits. An increase in unemployment directly leads to an increase in entry, and 
decrease in exit and profit. Finally, the interest rate only has a direct impact on entry: an 
increase in the interest rate corresponds to lower entry levels as expected.
Finally, we discuss the estimated correlation structure. We find a relatively large corre-
lation (0.35) between the error terms associated with entry and exit. This positive correla-
tion implies that many shocks lead to a change in both variables, that is, many shocks tend 
to affect turbulence. The correlation between the errors in entry or exit and profit are rather 
small.
4.1  Tests on trends
For each shop type we tested whether on average the long-run steady state entry rate 
exactly offsets the average long-run exit, such that the number of firms is constant in equi-
librium. In terms of the model parameters this means testing the restriction γ1i = γ2i. The 
corresponding hypothesis is not rejected in 58% of the cases. On the other hand, this result 
implies that for a large part of the shop types there is a positive or negative trend in the 
number of firms, this matches the reported data described in Table 2.
Next, for each shoptype we test whether the long-run relation between industry profit 
and number of firms contains a trend. We test the significance of the individual trends and 
find that in 73% of the cases the trend is not significant. Therefore, in the majority of cases 
the relationship between profits and number of firms does not move over time. A joint test 
on both hypothesis (entry offsets exit, no trend) is not rejected in 44% of the cases. So, 
about half of the shoptypes are stable in the sense that in the long-run, both total industry 
profits and the number of firms remain constant.
Next, for the cases where the number of firms shows a trend we test whether the profits 
are stable. The corresponding hypothesis is κ = γ1 − γ2 (compare Table 3). The results are 
given in Table 6. For the cases where the hypothesis is rejected we distinguish between 
declining profits and increasing profits. The table shows that in 20% of the shop types 
(industries), both the number of firms and industry profits decline.
Table 6 shows that, on average over the period 1980–2000, the majority of shop types 
(44%) in Dutch retailing showed no major changes in equilibrium industry structure. For 
about one-third of shop types, the equilibrium number of firms declined significantly over 
this period. For some industries, this finding corresponds with a development of increased 
scale and scope in Dutch retailing over this period, associated with increased average firm 
size. Explanations for this increase in average firm size include consolidation into retail 
chains, horizontal integration and ICT developments altering logistic operations in the 
Table 6  Steady state behavior for profits and number of firms (absolute number of shop types in parenthe-
ses)
Declining profits given no. 
firms
Stable profits given no. 
firms
Increasing 
profits given no. 
firms
Declining no. firms 20% (8) 10% (4) 2% (1)
Stable no. firms 7% (3) 44% (18) 7% (3)
Increasing no. firms 0% (0) 5% (2) 5% (2)
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retail trade (Creusen et al. 2006). For some other industries, the declining number of firms 
goes together with declining industry profits. This is likely associated with the end of the 
industry life cycle of certain shop types, reflecting the finite life of certain submarkets 
(Klepper 1997). This may for instance be the case for dairy shops (where the selling of 
dairy products was taken over by supermarkets) and for the sewing-machines industry (see 
Table 1).
5  Simulations and discussion
Having established a model with realistic features (both in terms of estimated model 
parameters and in terms of the distribution of industries over different types of steady state 
behavior as depicted in Table 6), we now move on to perform a simulation analysis based 
on our estimated model, which will enable us to answer the three research questions formu-
lated in the introduction.
In this section we use impulse response functions to investigate the impact of entry and 
exit shocks to a market in equilibrium. We measure the impact of the shock relative to 
the market development without a shock. By considering relative measures the impulse 
response functions become independent of the market-specific intercepts and trend. Fur-
thermore, we assume that all exogenous variables are constant and equal to their observed 
mean values over time. We consider a one-time purely exogenous shock (analogous to a 
‘disaster’) to an otherwise stable system. The size of the shock is taken to be 1%.
Percentage impact on entry 
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Percentage impact on number of firms 
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Fig. 2  Effect of a 1% shock to entry rate, all graphs give the change relative to the steady state levels prior 
to the shock
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In each case we investigate three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium 
caused by the impact of these shocks: net change, time of adjustment and the pattern of 
adjustment.17 ‘Net change’ measures the total effect of the shock comparing the initial 
and the new equilibrium states. It is the Schumpeterian element of our investigation, and 
it measures the permanent impact of the shock (the ‘disaster’) after recovery to the new 
equilibrium (i.e. the sustainable post-disaster level of economic activity) has been com-
pleted. ‘Time’ is about the duration of disequilibrium between these states (i.e. the time 
of recovery). It tests Schultz’s assumption that disequilibrium is the norm rather than a 
rarity. ‘Pattern’ is about the route that the adjustment process takes from the initial to the 
new equilibrium. Its analysis is important because economic analyses are often based upon 
comparative statics and the assumption of monotonic adjustment processes.18 This part 
of our analysis is particularly relevant for disaster management as we show that different 
routes or time-paths of recovery are associated with different post-disaster equilibria hav-
ing lasting impact on the economy (Xie et al. 2018).
Figure  2 shows the result of a 1% shock to entry on the five elements of the model 
including relative change in entry, exit, total profit, number of firms and profit per firm. 
The result of this shock is to cause more exit for at least 15 years,19 and permanently higher 
levels of total industry profits and the number of firms. Since the increase in the number of 
firms seems to be slightly larger than the increase in total profits, the figure suggests that 
average profit per firm is somewhat lower in the new steady state. However, since the esti-
mate for parameter λ is not significantly different from unity (see Table 4), we know that 
the difference in average profit per firm between the initial and new equilibrium does not 
significantly differ from zero (see also Eq. (9), where, for λ = 1, equilibrium average profits 
are independent of the number of firms).
Hence, as a result of the positive shock to entry, total profits as well as the number of 
firms permanently increase. In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to 
equilibrium, the shock to entry provides several insights. First we note that while there are 
no long term changes to entry and exit, the short term rise in net entry causes a permanent 
increase in the number of firms. This is associated with higher total industry profits. There-
fore, in terms of net change the shock to entry has a permanent effect on the economic 
size of the retail industry. Second, the timing of this adjustment process is far from instan-
taneous lasting approximately 10–15  years between the initial and the new equilibrium. 
Thirdly, the pattern of the adjustment process is non-monotonic and oscillates before it set-
tles on a convergent path towards the new equilibrium. This is particularly noticeable with 
profits per firm which first ‘overshoots’ and then ‘undershoots’ before finally converging 
towards the new equilibrium.
This pattern of adjustment following the shock to entry is consistent with an entrepre-
neurial function of entrants as predicted by Schumpeter (1947) and Schultz (1975), and 
similar to a disaster management function where the interaction between entrants and other 
actors in the system together determine the time-path and new equilibrium following an 
17 The importance of accounting for the timing of the adjustment process in empirical models of entry and 
exit is also stressed by Manjón-Antolín (2010).
18 Clearly, just as with classic disasters, the recovery path from market shocks often follows a non-mono-
tonic adjustment process. See for instance Reid (2007) with examples for the world of small businesses or 
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) for that of the tire industry.
19 This may be interpreted as the magnitude of the disaster in terms of lost flows of economic activity 
between the time of disaster and the time post-disaster equilibrium is reached (Xie et al. 2018).
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exogenous shock (disaster) to the system. Entrants have a disruptive impact on the mar-
ket, causing destruction of businesses and turbulence, a long period of disequilibrium, and 
importantly a permanent change in the market equilibrium or carrying capacity. Put dif-
ferently, the market does not return to the original pre-entry shock equilibrium carrying 
capacity and total industry profits are permanently changed. Notably, total industry profits 
are at a permanently higher level so in this case, the level of dynamic economic resilience 
seems to have been quite high (Duhamel et al. 2016).
The entry shock also causes an oscillating pattern for the average profit level per firm. 
At first, average profits rise, but after a few years, a sharp decrease is visible, after which 
the average profit level stabilizes. The question now is how this oscillating pattern can 
be explained, where average profits per firm initially rise above the pre-shock equilib-
rium level and then sharply decrease. The first part of this adjustment process is consist-
ent with innovation which expands market size by making the retail sector more attrac-
tive to consumers through effects such as expanding product variety (Krugman 1979) and 
creating new market segments. Looking at this from a product differentiation perspective 
the entrants’ innovation expands market space thereby creating disequilibrium. The emer-
gence in supernormal profits then attracts new entrants and the competitive process is then 
akin to models of product differentiation (e.g. Hotelling’s 1929 model of spatial competi-
tion) where average profits per firm decline. There are several alternative possibilities as 
to why the parameters estimated in our model illustrate this effect. These include the pos-
sibility that a shock increase in entry is associated with a fall in barriers to entry so that 
both the number of firms and the level of competition (not only on the product market 
but also on the factor market for employees; Roessler and Koellinger 2012) temporarily 
increase. Another alternative view is that entry shocks might be associated with reduc-
tions in resource constraints for entrants such as lack of finance (Evans and Jovanovic 
1989; Burke et al. 2000) thereby causing a period of excess entry which let average profits 
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Fig. 3  Effect of a 1% shock to exit rate, all graphs give the change relative to the steady state levels prior to 
the shock
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decline. Many other explanations and indeed associated counter arguments for these can be 
advanced (e.g. Cressy 1996) but as we noted earlier our research contribution is uncovering 
the adjustment process and highlighting its economic significance. A definitive interpreta-
tion of the estimated parameters is beyond the scope of this paper and hence is raised as an 
area for future research.
The impact of an exogenous shock to the number of exits is shown in Fig. 3. The fig-
ure shows that the entry rate increases for 10–15 years. However, the size of this impact 
is relatively small (note the different scales on the vertical axes for entry and exit). In the 
new steady state profit levels have decreased by more than 1.74%, the number of firms has 
decreased by about 1.86%.
In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium, we observe 
the following. First we note that there is again no permanent change to the equilibrium 
rate of entry and exit. These results match the stationary nature of the entry and exit rate. 
However, again consistent with an entrepreneurial role of firms, an exit shock causes a net 
decrease in the equilibrium number of firms and industry profit meaning that the industry 
does not recover to its initial equilibrium. Second, the timing of the adjustment process 
to the new equilibrium is again slow taking between 10 and 15  years. Thirdly, the pat-
tern of the adjustment process is not monotonic. Initially the shock to exit has a sustained 
affect causing the exit rate to stay above equilibrium for 6 years. The entry rate stays above 
the long run equilibrium for an even longer time, however this increase is not very large. 
Hence, in the case of a positive shock to exit the striking result is that the market never 
fully recovers: the size of the market decreases, both in terms of the number of firms, and 
in terms of total industry profit.
In general, the entry and exit shocks simulations of the empirically estimated parame-
ters of the model manifest permanent changes in the industry, i.e., there is a dynamic equi-
librium. In these processes entrants are found to play two roles. Initially, they perform an 
entrepreneurial function of creating disequilibrium; permanently undermining the existing 
equilibrium. Thereafter they play the conventional equilibrating role of moving the indus-
try to a new equilibrium. For instance, a shock to exit has a permanent effect in that the 
market does not recover as opposed to one in entry which has a permanent positive effect 
on the size of the market. These shocks cause a long period of disequilibrium, typically 
10–15 years, indicating the importance of the entrepreneurial function of entry and exit. 
This provides support for the Schultzian view that disequilibrium is the norm rather than 
the oddity. Moreover, we observe not only long periods of disequilibrium but also many 
non-monotonic adjustment processes which highlight their complexity. Frequently these 
processes are initially ‘erratic’ before earnest convergence to the new equilibrium sets in.
6  Conclusion
A huge theoretical literature exists on the role of entrepreneurial entry in disrupting or 
restoring market equilibrium yet hardly any empirical models have been developed in order 
to test these theories. In this paper we explored the role of entry in the context of the field 
of disaster management while also drawing insights from the economics of entrepreneur-
ship literature. We constructed a dynamic model capable of testing these insights where 
entrants are entrepreneurial and bring innovation that affects the long run equilibrium car-
rying capacity of a market (à la Schumpeter). The model also encompasses more tradi-
tional classical perspectives on entry and exit where firms can be easily replaced and where 
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entry and exit respond to market equilibrium causing a swift return to equilibrium. Hence, 
our model enables to discriminate between the entrants’ role of performing the entrepre-
neurial function of creating disequilibrium (causing a gradual ‘disaster’ to incumbent play-
ers in the market) and their conventional equilibrating role of moving the industry to a 
new equilibrium. In terms of the field of disaster management, entrepreneurial entry can 
be regarded as a (gradual) disaster while the restoration towards a new equilibrium as dis-
aster management. Moreover, the model allows for an analysis of three aspects of industry 
dynamics: the effect of entry and exit on market equilibrium, the duration of disequilib-
rium (time of recovery), and the patterns of adjustment (route of recovery). Based on these 
aspects we test the main features of three seminal theories on the economic role of entry 
and exit: neoclassical theory, Schumpeter and Schultz.
We apply our dynamic model to a rich dataset on Dutch retailing—a sector with exten-
sive diversity. For many retail markets (44%) we find a stable equilibrium, that is, in equi-
librium profits do not change and the number of firms stays constant. Note that in such an 
equilibrium there may still be a replacement of firms, that is, the entry and exit rates are 
equal but not necessarily zero. On the other hand, for 20% of the markets we established 
an equilibrium in which both total industry profits and the number of firms decline. Such 
markets are becoming less important overall, a likely example of such a market are music 
stores. In these markets exit (and entry) have an important role of maintaining equilibrium 
by reducing the number of firms to keep trend with the decrease in total industry profits.
Using simulation analysis, we also find that entry plays an entrepreneurial role and 
when in disequilibrium, a market does not simply gravitate back towards the previous equi-
librium carrying capacity in the market. Instead, we find that a shock to entry causes dis-
equilibrium, the resulting adjustment process to equilibrium is sufficiently slow so that, in 
line with economics theorists of entrepreneurship (most notably, Schultz), markets spend 
long protracted periods in disequilibrium. In this process they undergo turbulence and a 
non-monotonic adjustment towards equilibrium. Notably, in line with Schumpeter, it is a 
new equilibrium as the disruptive effect of entry grows markets so that a shock to the entry 
rate has a permanent long term positive effect on the number of firms and total industry 
profits. These effects are proportionate so that average profit per firm in the new equilib-
rium does not significantly differ from that in the old equilibrium. Our simulation analysis 
provides support for the claims by Xie et al. (2018) that the time-path of disaster recovery, 
the disaster losses and the post-disaster equilibrium are strongly connected.
Correspondingly, a shock to exit causes a long term permanent decrease in the num-
ber of firms and industry profits with average profits per firm again remaining stable. The 
results provide some new insights and likely challenges for public policy aimed at enhanc-
ing economic performance; particularly those concerned with limiting the downside of 
business closures (exits) and the benefits of new entrants. Our findings illustrate that entry 
and exit are more important for long term economic performance than implied by more 
conventional analysis which overlooks the entrepreneurial role of firms.
In terms of the three different theories on the economic role of entry and exit, our empir-
ical findings show that industry dynamics in Dutch retailing show features of all three theo-
ries: a shock in entry causes a new market equilibrium à la Schumpeter and the adjustment 
process is non-monotonic and slow causing long periods of disequilibrium à la Schultz. 
Regarding neo-classical theory, although our simulation analysis of the consequences of 
shocks to entry and exit do not lend much support to neo-classical theory (as the old equi-
librium is not restored, and the adjustment to the new equilibrium follows a non-monotonic 
path), the majority (44%) of markets that remain in a stable equilibrium does seem to be 
more consistent with neo-classical theory, as the role of entry and exit in these markets is 
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relatively limited. Hence, our empirical results suggest that, although to some extent the 
three theories contradict each other, they are also compatible with each other.
The field of disaster management is expanding rapidly and new insights from other 
disciplines are increasingly being added to inform disaster management literature. For 
instance, recent studies have added perspectives from project management (Prasad et  al. 
2017), commercial supply chain management (Olaogbebikan and Oloruntoba 2017; Behl 
and Dutta 2018) and internet of things (IoT) technology (Sinha et al. 2017; Han et al. 2018) 
literatures. In a similar vein, the current study adds new insights from the economics of 
entrepreneurship literature. Future research may focus on distinguishing between different 
types of firm entry and exit at the industry level, e.g. in terms of de novo entry versus 
entrants that relocate from another industry, and exiting firms that cease operations versus 
exiting firms that relocate to another industry (Plehn-Dujowich 2009). Another useful dis-
tinction may be based on the size of the firm entries and exits (Manjón-Antolín 2010).
In sum, studying economic markets and using economic modelling, our paper has con-
tributed to disaster management literature by showing how different time-paths following a 
shock may be related to different post-shock equilibria.
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